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@reyang reyang commented Jul 30, 2025

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@reyang reyang requested a review from a team as a code owner July 30, 2025 08:19
Comment on lines +124 to +126
- repository configurations - for example, a hotfix branch might not have the
proper branch protection rules, or the repository might not have the proper
security settings enabled.
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This should be mostly covered by org-wide config-as-code tooling by now but we don't cover custom branches beyond main there usually, right?

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Right.
This is more serving as a check list for the maintainers, while working on cleaning up the branch policies we have noticed several projects not protecting things correctly (couple of them were surprising).

Comment on lines +127 to +129
- package dependencies - for example, a package might have a known
vulnerability, or a package might be using a deprecated version of a
library.
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We might want to put that one to the top of the list as it's the most frequent concern that's brought up.

Comment on lines +154 to +157
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
discovery.
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities are patched within 4 weeks of
discovery.
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While it's good to document an SLA here, I think it should be defined more clearly rather than just in the checklist that's summarizing the above.
When this is done, we should likely point out that this is a best-effort guideline for the project itself but without any guarantees or legal implications.

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We have the following wording in the Collector SIG in case it helps:

We aim to provide a release that fixes security-related issues in at most 30 days since they are publicly announced; with the current release schedule this means security issues will typically not warrant a bugfix release.

Comment on lines +154 to +157
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
discovery.
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities are patched within 4 weeks of
discovery.
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We have the following wording in the Collector SIG in case it helps:

We aim to provide a release that fixes security-related issues in at most 30 days since they are publicly announced; with the current release schedule this means security issues will typically not warrant a bugfix release.

Comment on lines +155 to +158
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
discovery.
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities are patched within 4 weeks of
discovery.
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I think these are a bit too aggressive. You can see e.g. these ones from Gitlab: https://handbook.gitlab.com/handbook/security/product-security/vulnerability-management/sla/
where low and medium have a 90/180 day SLA. I think we should align to something like that

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The OpenSSF questionnaire says

There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days.

I would go with that maybe at least for the core repos

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@reyang reyang Aug 14, 2025

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The OpenSSF questionnaire says

There MUST be no unpatched vulnerabilities of medium or higher severity that have been publicly known for more than 60 days.

I would go with that maybe at least for the core repos

I feel this is a low bar and we should put a higher one. Here is my thinking: OpenTelemetry components are widely used by other OSS components, if our bar is to get the medium or higher CVEs patched in 60 days, we are not giving sufficient time for our users (including other OSS software that depend on us) to meet their 60 days time. That's the reason why I put 4 weeks.

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I think a higher bar makes sense to some but not all OpenTelemetry components necessarily (e.g. I don't think a security vulnerability in, say, Weaver, is as problematic as one in opentelemetry-python: they have different use cases with different security implications and their usage is different). I am in favor of a stronger requirement in specific components, but since this is an universal standard I think we should put a lower bar here

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Makes sense to me. Do you feel this is a good balance?

Core components: 30 days
Everything else: 60 days

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Sounds reasonable to me

- [ ] False positives are documented (e.g., by commenting on the security
advisory, by providing the dismissal reason to a code scanning alert) and
dismissed.
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
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not sure about wording

Suggested change
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities (after rescoring if needed?) are patched within 2 weeks of

dismissed.
- [ ] Critical and high severity vulnerabilities are patched within 2 weeks of
discovery.
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities are patched within 4 weeks of
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not sure about wording

Suggested change
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities are patched within 4 weeks of
- [ ] Medium and low severity vulnerabilities (regardless of rescoring) are patched within 4 weeks of

@carlosalberto
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IMHO this looks good.

Comment on lines +137 to +138
the worst case, this can be a potential end-of-life announcement of the
affected component or project.
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"or project" made me think catastrophic end of OpenTelemetry

Suggested change
the worst case, this can be a potential end-of-life announcement of the
affected component or project.
the worst case, this can be a potential end-of-life announcement of the
affected component.

- [ ] Daily scan CI/CD environment for deprecations and vulnerabilities.
- [ ] Daily scan container image dependencies for deprecations and
vulnerabilities.
- [ ] Daily scan repository configurations for deprecations and vulnerabilities.
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is this something maintainers can do?

Comment on lines +103 to +107
- The maintainers of an OpenTelemetry project should establish a clear
accountability for security issues, including identifying the direct
responsible individual for security issues at a certain time, for
example, via a duty rotation. This should be
documented in the main README.md file of the project.
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this feels a bit heavyweight for most of the repos to establish a DRI rotation where there are 2-3 maintainers

as long as the maintainers are meeting the bar we are setting for triage / fixing

if we want to keep this, maybe "... or some other process that ensures vulnerabilities are being triaged in a timely manner"

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5 participants